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ARGUMENT 
A. The district court abused its discretion in denying the Campbells' motion for 
reconsideration. 
Decidedly producing vast amounts of argument in their Respondent's Brief, the 
Kvammes fail to address directly the issue raised on appeal. Shortened to its pertinent point, 
the Kvammes' position is stated in paragraph 3 on page 36 of their brief, "They [Rules 
1 l(a)(2)(B) and 60(b)(2)] are both subject to the same standard-that is, both I.R.C.P. 
l l(a)(2)(B) and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) are discretionary, not mandatory." (Emphasis original.) 
Thus, while accurately identifying that both motions are addressed to the discretion of 
the district court, the Kvammes overlook the Cambpells' argument on the crucial and 
differing standards the district court must apply when considering motions under those 
separate rules. 
Unquestionably, the Campells timely filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B). 
The standard applicable to the exercise of the district court's discretion on a motion 
for reconsideration is as follows. When faced with a motion for reconsideration, the district 
court must consider additional information in the form of admissible testimony in an 
affidavit; the district court does not have discretion to ignore such positive testimony. Kepler-
Fleenor v. Fremont County, 268 P.3d 1159, 152 Idaho 207 (2012); PHH Mortg. Services 
Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635-636, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184-1185 (2009). 
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"Whether or not the district court erred in refusing to consider the new 
evidence depends upon what the Perreiras wanted the district court to 
reconsider. The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the 
correctness of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion 
under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." 
PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho at 635, 200 P.3d at 1184 (2009)(emphasis 
added). 
Once the court actually considers any new evidence on a motion for reconsideration, 
it then applies its discretion to determine whether that evidence would alter or change the 
judgment entered. If so, the court should exercise its discretion in granting relief. If not, the 
court may exercise its discretion denying relief. 
Based upon the district court's colloquy at the time of hearing the Camp bells' motion 
for reconsideration as to its obligation to consider the additional evidence, together with the 
language in its subsequent order denying the Campbells' motion, it is clear the court applied 
the wrong standard. Application of the wrong standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941P.2d314 (1997). 
Summary judgment was granted to the K vammes due to the lack of foundation for a 
record of survey. The affidavit of Kevin Thompson provided the necessary foundation for 
admissibility of the record of survey and added further factual information pertinent to the 
issues on summary judgment. Such evidence would unquestionably alter or change the 
summary judgment entered in favor of the K vammes. 
Furthermore, the district court in its memorandum decision and order, determined that 
the affidavit of Thompson would not be considered because "the evidence is not new ... " and 
it "should have been submitted months ago." (Clerk's Record, Vol. IV, p. 773). Again, that is 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 2 
not the standard a district court applies to a motion for reconsideration. That is the type of 
standard applied to the "newly discovered evidence" provision of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2). 
In PHH v. Perreira, the Idaho Supreme Court noted the difference in stating, "the 
trial court cannot consider new evidence when asked to reconsider a final judgment pursuant 
to a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), id., or pursuant to a motion to 
amend findings of fact or conclusions oflaw under Rule 52(b)." Id. 
The district court determined the affidavit of Thompson was not "new" in the sense of 
newly discovered. A fact emphasized by the court where it stated the evidence should have 
been produced earlier. In short, the new evidence submitted by the Camp bells as part of their 
motion for reconsideration was simply not considered by the district court. 
Failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. The 
district court erred in denying the Campbells' motion for reconsideration. 
B. "Right result, wrong theory" rule does not apply. 
On cross-appeal, the K vammes contend the district court made the correct decision to 
grant summary judgment in their favor albeit on a wrong theory. However, the record on 
appeal discloses the unmistakable fact that the district court did not make any factual 
determinations concerning the competing theories; rather, the court simply reached a 
conclusion that the Campbells had failed to provide the foundation necessary to render a 
record of survey admissible for purposes of summary judgment. Consequently, there is 
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nothing in the record on appeal giving the appellate court the required factual determinations 
to allow it to act as a trial court and decide whether the K vammes' theories can be supported. 
This Court has generally held that where an order of a lower court is correct 
but is based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the 
correct theory. We therefore review the theories advanced by seller in order to 
determine if they provide a basis for upholding the trial court's granting of 
partial summary judgment. The trial court, however, made no finding on 
whether the order form was intended as a fully integrated agreement. The 
trial court is the appropriate forum for such a determination and as such the 
trial court should be given the opportunity on remand to make such a 
determination. 
Anderson & Naftiger v. G. T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 180, 595 P.2d 709, 714 
(1979)( emphasis added). 
The district court's judgment arose from cross-motions for summary judgment. The 
Campbells filed their motion supported by affidavit and deposition testimony. Then, the 
K vammes presented affidavits challenging the Camp bells' motion and on their own moved 
for summary judgment on their claims. The record before the district court contained 
volumes of affidavits, deposition testimony, and counter affidavits all containing various 
disputes of fact. Viewed dispassionately, the evidence presented on summary judgment 
shows genuine issues of fact pertaining to the fence line in question and its history of use. 
The district court made no determinations of those disputed facts. Rather, the district court 
simply did not address the substance of either party's motion when it ruled that the record of 
survey lacked foundation. 
Moreover, the doctrine of "right result-wrong theory" does not apply to the issue of 
abuse of discretion as raised by the Camp bells. 
The petitioners' alternative argument, that we should uphold the court's order 
under Rule 41 (b ), misapplies the "right result-wrong theory" doctrine. This 
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doctrine does not apply to issues of discretion. It applies only to issues where 
an alternative rule of law can be applied to a given body of facts, yielding the 
same legally correct answer. Where an issue is one of discretion, there is no 
single, legally "correct" answer. Standards of Appellate Review § 3 .4, 
IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK (Idaho Law Foundation, 1985). The 
proper appellate response, when an exercise of discretion is tainted by legal 
error, is not to usurp such discretion ourselves but to set aside the lower 
court's ruling and to remand the case. Id. 
Agrodyne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342, 348, 757 P.2d 205, 211 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The Campbells appealed from the denial of their motion for reconsideration and the 
court's preceding summary judgment. As in Agrodyne, the issue on appeal in this matter is 
whether the district abused its discretion. Consequently, the rule of right result-wrong theory 
has no application. 
Adverse Possession 
The strength of the K vammes' position on their claim for adverse possession rests 
entirely on the as yet unmade judicial determination of whether Thompson's record of survey 
was performed in accordance with survey standards. The K vammes have not presented any 
other survey to the district court on which they base their claims. In short, the Kvammes 
contend that they have paid taxes on all land extending north of the disputed fence line. Their 
contention is grounded upon their theory that the north half of the section is, in fact, the fence 
line. That contention is refuted by Thompson's survey and his affidavit. 
As shown by the transcript of the hearing on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the Kvammes hotly challenged the district court's observation from the bench that 
the Kvammes' theory about a "nominal section" measurement did not square with the court's 
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understanding of standard survey practice of identifying comers and measuring the quarter 
sections. (Transcript, pages 38-54). 
If Thompson's record of survey is judicially determined to comply with survey 
standards, the Camp bells and not the K vammes would be entitled to summary judgment on 
the claim for adverse possession. If there are genuine issues of material fact concerning 
Thompson's record of survey, then summary judgment must be denied and the action 
proceed to trial. Finally, the evidence shows the Kvammes rented the Campbells' property 
for a period of time prior to the filing of this action. As renters, the K vammes recognized the 
Campbells' title and accepted that title without dispute. 
Consequently, the record on appeal does not contain sufficient evidence to permit the 
appellate court to make the necessary factual determinations needed to sustain the Kvammes' 
theories. See Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009)(the record on 
appeal is sufficient to determine whether claims have merit); Eimco Corp. v. Sims, 100 Idaho 
390, 598 P.2d 538 (1979). 
As noted in the Appellants' Brief, the record of survey performed by Kevin 
Thompson is the only record of survey before the district court. If that record of survey is 
admissible through the foundation of Kevin Thompson, then the arguments raised by the 
K vammes based on their theory of measurement of a "nominal section" all fail. 
To that end, it bears restating the applicable rule. If reasonable people could reach 
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, a motion for 
summary judgment must be denied. Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 3 P.3d 51 (2000). 
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Boundary by Agreement 
For similar reasons as set forth above, the Kvammes' claim of boundary by 
agreement likewise cannot be sustained on appeal. 
First, the district court did not examine the facts pertaining to the claim of boundary 
by agreement to determine whether there were genuine issues of material fact. On appeal, the 
appellate court has insufficient record before it to demonstrate conclusively that the 
Kvammes have sustained all elements of their claim for boundary by agreement. 
Second, the affidavits of Margy Spradling and Jo Le Campbell filed in support of the 
Campbells' motion for summary judgment are contested by affidavits filed in support of the 
Kvammes' motion. Such contests of facts prevent any court from granting summary 
judgment. 
Third, the evidence before the district court on summary judgment when viewed most 
favorably for the Campbells shows the Campbells and their predecessors in interest knew the 
fence line was fifteen feet south of what they knew to be the deeded boundary and they never 
agreed that the fence line would be treated as the boundary. 
Again, if reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence, a motion for summary judgment must be denied. Kelso v. 
Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 3 P.3d 51 (2000). 
On appeal, the Kvammes' invitation for the appellate court to become the trial court 
should be declined. 
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Accordingly, the Kvammes' cross-appeal on the rule of right result-wrong theory 
should be denied. 
The Kvammes have presented argument or authority for any of the other issues on 
appeal they noted in their notice of cross-appeal. Consequently, those issues need not be 
considered by the Court on appeal. Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor, 145 
Idaho 415, 179 P.3d 1071 (2008). 
C. The K vammes' request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied. 
On appeal, as in the district court, the K vammes request an award of attorney fees in 
accordance with LC.§ 12-121. 
In the event the Court vacates or reverses the district court's denial of the Campbells' 
motion for reconsideration and grant of summary judgment, then the Kavammes would not 
be the prevailing party and it would not necessary to discuss whether the appeal was brought 
or defended unreasonably under LC. § 12-121. Caldwell v. Cornetta, 151 Idaho 34, 41, 253 
P.3d 708 (2011). 
On appeal, the Campbells presented a legitimate issue for the court to consider. The 
district court's determination not to consider the affidavit of Kevin Thompson filed as part of 
the Campbells' timely motion for reconsideration raised a genuine issue of abuse of 
discretion. Where the district court held the record of survey lacked foundation and, thus, the 
Campbells did not sustain their burden, an affidavit that supplies the missing foundation 
should be considered in order to reach a fair and just result. Therefore, no fees are available 
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against a party that presents a legitimate question for the Court to address. Lane Ranch P'ship 
v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007). 
Furthermore, an award under 12-121 is appropriate when the Court "has the abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 355, 63 P.3d 474, 481 (2003). 
Despite the accusations lodged by the Kvammes against the Campbells and their counsel, the 
Campbells have a solid basis for appeal. They have a survey. It shows they are the owners of 
the property in question. The record on appeal shows the Campbells properly posted security 
to preserve the award of costs made to the K vammes while the appeal is pending. Contrary to 
assertions made, the Campbells genuinely believe their position has merit and they have not 
appealed for the purpose of delaying justice or harassing the K vammes. 
The Kvammes' request for an award of fees on appeal should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion m denying the Campbells' motion for 
reconsideration. 
The record on appeal does not permit the Court to uphold on disputed and non-
determined facts summary judgment for the K vammes' on their claims of adverse possession 
or boundary by agreement. 
The district court's order denying the Campbells' motion for reconsideration and its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment should be vacated together with 
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the subsequent Judgment based on the district court's order. The case should be remanded to 
the district court with directions to review the Affidavit of Kevin Thompson and reconsider 
the cross motions for summary judgment. 
Dated this day of November 2012. 
--4-
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Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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